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CHAPTER 15

HOT WAR AND COLD WART, 1945-1953

[b.4]

ADVANCE TO THE YALU RIVER

The push north

Flushed with victory after MacArthur's Inchon landings that virtually destroyed the North Korean Army (15 Sept. 1950), Truman, with UN approval, ordered UN forces north of the 38th parallel with the goal of unifying the peninsula by military force. This was a mistake. A northward move clearly went beyond the original goal of restoring South Korea's sovereignty. But Truman was under pressure from conservatives to "roll back" communist forces and teach them a lesson.

The Chinese warning

As the US Eighth Army and X Corps move north, the Chinese warned MacArthur, the UN, and Truman not to come closer. The Yalu River dividing North Korea from Manchuria was a sensitive region for the Chinese because it contained industries and hydroelectric plants. MacArthur refused to believe the Chinese would intervene.

Chinese intervention in Korea

The Red Chinese sprang an unpleasant surprise in November 1950. Over one million Chinese troops infiltrated down the mountain rides that separated UN forces. They attacked with such ferocity that UN forces were forced to beat a hasty retreat. It was disastrous. Marines were blowing up ammunition to keep it from falling into communist hands; whole battalions of US army troops were destroyed as Chinese forces swept out of the mountains. MacArthur wired to Washington that, "we face an entirely new war."

Seoul falls

In December 1950, Chinese forces captured Seoul, South Korea . It was the 2d time in the war that communist forces had taken the southern capital.

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[b.6]

TRUMAN FIRES MACARTHUR

MacArthur breaks civil-military protocols

Truman fired General MacArthur in April 1951 because MacArthur challenged the President's control of national policy. The Chinese intervention shocked the normally cocksure general. He alternated between episodes of despair and euphoria. In panic laced messages to the White House and Pentagon MacArthur spoke of pulling out of Korea one day then urged the bombing of the Manchuria side of the Yalu River, even with atomic weapons.

Truman refused to bomb China and ordered MacArthur to fight a limited war in Korea.

Truman must consider global demands of containment

The US had defense concerns that girdled the globe; As commander-in-chief, Truman would not gut the forces in Europe for transfer to Korea, thus weakening the defense of Europe--an area of far great strategic importance to the US than Korea. MacArthur as an "Asia Firster" and did not accept Truman conclusions. MacArthur was also unwilling to fight a limited war, believing there was "no substitute for victory," which in the American experience meant "total victory."

MacArthur's big ego

When Truman refused to concur with this general's outlook, MacArthur made inappropriate statement to the press criticizing his commander-in-chief. Truman fired MacArthur with the full approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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[d.1]

HOW THE KOREAN WAR ENDED

POW exchange was the hang-up

Proponents of World System theory Argue that men like Acheson, Dulles, Truman, and Harriman, intentionally prolonged the Korean War to allow NSC-68 time to kick in and become US containment policy (see Thomas McCormick, America's Half Century). The war lasted 3 years. The Chinese had given up demanding a seat in the United Nations, the annexation of Taiwan, and the unification of Korea. In 1953, Stalin died, which further weakened their desire to continue the war. But the issue of repatriation remained a thorny problem.

China want forcible repatriation

About 1/4 of the 100,000 North Korean and Chinese POW's did not want to return home. Likewise, 359 out of 13,444 UN POW's did not want to return. China wanted these men forcibly returned. The UN stood for voluntary return.

China concedes

It was not until the end of the war, June 1953, that China agreed to voluntary repatriation. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) including India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland supervised the transfer of prisoners and determined what their wishes were. When operation LITTLE SWITCH and BIG SWITCH were completed, the truce was signed (17 July 1953).

Rhee attempts to sabotage agreement

There was an interesting side note. Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea, opposed UN control of the transfer process. He wanted to fight the war until Korea was unified. On 18 June 1953, he ordered his guard to release 25,000 North Korean prisoners who had made it known they did not wish to return to the North. This embarrassing act by our ally nearly ended the peace talks at Panmunjom. But the agreement held and the POW exchanges proceeded as planned.

OTHER POWERPOINTS

15.a.01--nuclear stockpile
15.a.02--Nat'l Sec Act
15.a.06--NSC 68
15.b.01--Origins of Korea

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	CHAPTER 15
	HOT WAR AND COLD WART, 1945-1953


	[b.4]		ADVANCE TO THE YALU RIVER
	The push north		Flushed with victory after MacArthur's Inchon landings that virtually destroyed the North Korean Army (15 Sept. 1950), Truman, with UN approval, ordered UN forces north of the 38th parallel with the goal of unifying the peninsula by military force. This was a mistake. A northward move clearly went beyond the original goal of restoring South Korea's sovereignty. But Truman was under pressure from conservatives to "roll back" communist forces and teach them a lesson.
	The Chinese warning		As the US Eighth Army and X Corps move north, the Chinese warned MacArthur, the UN, and Truman not to come closer. The Yalu River dividing North Korea from Manchuria was a sensitive region for the Chinese because it contained industries and hydroelectric plants. MacArthur refused to believe the Chinese would intervene.
	Chinese intervention in Korea		The Red Chinese sprang an unpleasant surprise in November 1950. Over one million Chinese troops infiltrated down the mountain rides that separated UN forces. They attacked with such ferocity that UN forces were forced to beat a hasty retreat. It was disastrous. Marines were blowing up ammunition to keep it from falling into communist hands; whole battalions of US army troops were destroyed as Chinese forces swept out of the mountains. MacArthur wired to Washington that, "we face an entirely new war."
	Seoul falls		In December 1950, Chinese forces captured Seoul, South Korea . It was the 2d time in the war that communist forces had taken the southern capital.
			back to top


	[b.6]		TRUMAN FIRES MACARTHUR
	MacArthur breaks civil-military protocols		Truman fired General MacArthur in April 1951 because MacArthur challenged the President's control of national policy. The Chinese intervention shocked the normally cocksure general. He alternated between episodes of despair and euphoria. In panic laced messages to the White House and Pentagon MacArthur spoke of pulling out of Korea one day then urged the bombing of the Manchuria side of the Yalu River, even with atomic weapons.
			Truman refused to bomb China and ordered MacArthur to fight a limited war in Korea.
	Truman must consider global demands of containment		The US had defense concerns that girdled the globe; As commander-in-chief, Truman would not gut the forces in Europe for transfer to Korea, thus weakening the defense of Europe--an area of far great strategic importance to the US than Korea. MacArthur as an "Asia Firster" and did not accept Truman conclusions. MacArthur was also unwilling to fight a limited war, believing there was "no substitute for victory," which in the American experience meant "total victory."
	MacArthur's big ego		When Truman refused to concur with this general's outlook, MacArthur made inappropriate statement to the press criticizing his commander-in-chief. Truman fired MacArthur with the full approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
			back to top


	[d.1]		HOW THE KOREAN WAR ENDED
	POW exchange was the hang-up		Proponents of World System theory Argue that men like Acheson, Dulles, Truman, and Harriman, intentionally prolonged the Korean War to allow NSC-68 time to kick in and become US containment policy (see Thomas McCormick, America's Half Century). The war lasted 3 years. The Chinese had given up demanding a seat in the United Nations, the annexation of Taiwan, and the unification of Korea. In 1953, Stalin died, which further weakened their desire to continue the war. But the issue of repatriation remained a thorny problem.
	China want forcible repatriation		About 1/4 of the 100,000 North Korean and Chinese POW's did not want to return home. Likewise, 359 out of 13,444 UN POW's did not want to return. China wanted these men forcibly returned. The UN stood for voluntary return.
	China concedes		It was not until the end of the war, June 1953, that China agreed to voluntary repatriation. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) including India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland supervised the transfer of prisoners and determined what their wishes were. When operation LITTLE SWITCH and BIG SWITCH were completed, the truce was signed (17 July 1953).
	Rhee attempts to sabotage agreement		There was an interesting side note. Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea, opposed UN control of the transfer process. He wanted to fight the war until Korea was unified. On 18 June 1953, he ordered his guard to release 25,000 North Korean prisoners who had made it known they did not wish to return to the North. This embarrassing act by our ally nearly ended the peace talks at Panmunjom. But the agreement held and the POW exchanges proceeded as planned.

			OTHER POWERPOINTS
			15.a.01--nuclear stockpile 15.a.02--Nat'l Sec Act 15.a.06--NSC 68 15.b.01--Origins of Korea


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