CHAPTER 6
	THE REVOLUTIONARY REPUBLIC
			Stylized portrait of Washington's crossing of the Delaware River, 24 December 1776. Washington surprised a Hessian garrion at Trenton , New Jersey, hat night.
			General George Washington's headquarters on the Brandywine Battlefield. The battle was fought about 21 miles southwest of Philadelphia. Washington lost but retained his army.
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			6.a.1 British Strategy, 1776 6.a.2 Battle Tactics of the 18th Century 6.b.1 British Strategy, 1777 6.b.2 Composition of the Continental Army 6.b.5 France and America, 1778 (see 212) 6.e.1 British Strategy, 1778 6.e.2 Washington's Strategy, 1778 6.e.4 Nathaniel Green Related WWW Links
	[a.1]		BRITISH STRATEGY, 1776
	Bringing Mr. Washington's army to battle		In March 1776, the British evauated Boston. The bloody confrontations at Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill and the King's rejection of the Olive Branch Peition had led to full-scale colonial revolt. The men responsible for planning British strategy were George Germain, Secretary of the Colonies, and Lord North, the Prime Minister. In 1776 they selected Sir William Howe to command an expeditionary force with destination America. Their strategy was simple: Hurl 32,000 men and half the Royal Navy at New York. Lure Washington's army into open battle. Destroy Washington's army.
	Near British success at Battle of Long Island, 1776		At the Battle of Long Island (27 August 1776) Howe nearly obliterated Washington's army. But Washington escaped destruction when he rowed the shattered remnants of his army across the East River from Brooklyn to Manhattan. Why did Howe let him get away?
	Why British strategy failed		British strategic thinking during the war was fuzzy. London never made a clear decision whether it would seek the destruction of the rebel army, or to seek concilliation with the colonies. Lord Howe, who had an American mistress, sympathized with the American cause. Neither Howe's political views or his 18th century view of limited war left room for a war of annihaltion.
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	[a.2]		BATTLE TACTICS OF THE 18th CENTURY
	18th Century warfare was formal		Russell F. Weigley, one of the most published American military history scholar alive, says the 18th century (1700's) was the "Age of Battles." Modelers love to re-enact this era. The brilliant colors and the openess with which armies displayed themselves on battle fields conjure up images military glory barley equaled by any other age. In this age of enlightenment, it was an axiom that the best generals never had to fight. The ideal was to manuever one's opponent into impossible positions, forcing them to give battle on unequal terms or retreat. But when armies did meet, the battles were violent and bloody.
	limitations of technology		The following list charterizes aspects of the Revlolutionary war battles. Keep in mind that the Continental Army styled itself after the British army. Unless otherwise noted, the notes below apply to both sides:
	the muskets		British The 1769 Short Land Pattern Musket ("Brown Bess") range: 50 yds with 50% chance of hitting something the size of a large door. rate of fire: 4 shots per minute.bayonet: yes. American French Charleville (esp. after 1777). Its characteristics were about the same as the "Brown Bess". Both muskets used black powder and fired a 1 oz. ball about 800 feet per second. Thick white smoke enveloped the battle field when these muskets fired vollies en masse. Their highly inaccurate fire and slow reload time dictated the formations into which commanders deployed their troops.
	the bayonet		After a few musket vollies, many 18th century battles ended with a bayonet charge. One side gave way under the shock of "cold steel" if the firepower of the musketry had failed to achieve decisive results. British training was superior, especially before 1778.
	linear formations and massed ranks		1. Formations were linear, which meant armies fought in lines and columns on open fields. The open style of warfare aided command and control. Night operations and winter campaigning were virtually unheard of. 2. Firepower was achieved through mass and concentration. This meant soldiers delivering vollies standing shoulder-to-shoulder. 3. Volume counted more than accuracy. Men were marched to within short range of the enemy to generate enought firepower to bust the enemy line. 4. Battalions were deployed in ranks 2- or 3-deep, with a front of 150-250 yards across. 5. For rapid movement commanders formed troops into columns.
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	[b.1]		BRITISH STRATEGY, 1777
	Three pronged attack		Objective: Same as 1776. This time it would be a three pronged plan instead of one massive blow:
			Sir William Howe: The British main force would move by sea from NY and sail up the Cheasapeake Bay. They would disembark on march on Philadelphia. Hopefully Washington would make a stand so that he could be destroyed.
			John Burgoyne: Decend from Montreal down the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route to NY city. This would cutt off New England from the rest of the colonies.
			Barry St. Ledger: Slice easward down the Mohawk Valley from Ft. Oswego and link up with Burgoyne at Albany, NY.
	How it went		Howe captured Philadelphia after the Battle of Brandywine (11 Sept. 1777). St. Ledger was halted at Ft. Stanwix. Burgoyne met with disaster: Swarms of militiamen in the forests of upstate NY under the command of Horatio Gates and Daniel Morgan, pinned Burgoyne down. Completely cut-off, Burgoyne surrendered 17 October 1777. Clinton replaced Howe in 1778. In June 1778, Clinton evacuated Philadelphia and returned to New York. Washington's army had survived the winter encampment at Valley Forge and received good training from Baron von Stueben. Never again, however, did Washington or the Continental Congress dare meet the British main army in battle.
	[b.2]		COMPOSITION OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY
	View 1: Method of recruitment led to low quality troops		The American Revolution spawned a "dual army" tradition: (1) the militia and (2) the regular "Continental" army . The Continental Army, established in June 1775, comprised originally the forces beseiging the British army in Boston. George Washington, the first commander of the Continental Army, distrusted the militia, believing that a professional army was needed to endure the hardship of a long war and the test of battle. Who joined the Continental Army? Congress assigned a quota to each state. If the state could not entice men to volunteer, they had to draft men from the militia rolls. Don Higginbotham, a historian, says that this method injected the ranks with low quality men.
	View 2: Continental soldiers were stalwarts		Historian Charles Royster offered an alternative view. To him the Continental soldier was motivated by high ideals. He contends that a fair number of inspired middle-class men with a real stake in society comprised the majority of Continental enlistments. Evasion of military service was so easy that only the most dedicated would have stuck it out through depressing episodes like the Battles of Long Island (1776), Brandwine (1777), and Valley Forge (1778). These were, indeed, the "winter soldiers."
	a variety of social origins		The list below shows how varied the ranks were: farmers laborers criminals a few x-slaves (most of them joined the British) POW (British deserters) though they were few a scattering of small merchants vagabonds
	Survival of the Army kept Revolution alive		Either way, it was the Continental Army that stuck together and helped ensure the patriot victory in the Revolutionary War. However, as the mutinies of 1781 showed, the troops demanded payment for their services. Nonetheless, Army reformers and planners after the war who wanted a large, nationally controlled army often pointed to the proud performance of the Continental Army.
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	[e.1]		BRITISH STRATEGY AFTER 1778
	The changing global situation		The American war merged into a global conflict by 1778. As a result, Britain shifted it efforts from the mid-Atlantic colonies to the southern colonies. France (1777) and Spain and Holland (1779) joined the war against Britain. Together they threatened English possessions in the Carribean. British land and naval forces were now needed in other parts of the world.
	The new plan		Germain, Clinton, and North believed loyalism was strong in the south. The new British plan would rely heavily on pro-British sentiment in the southern colonies. Restoring royal control in the south would provide a base of operations for a move northward to rejoin Clinton's main force stationed in NYC. British forces would eventually march north from Virginia while Clinton made a thrust from his base in New York. Washinton's army could be caught in between this nutcracker and destroyed.
	The southern campaign starts well but end in British defeat		The new British strategy started off well. Savannah fell (1779) followed by Charleston, SC (1780). Cornwallis marched inland and defeated Horatio Gates at the Battle of Camden, SC (1780). Washinton dispatched Green to the south to stabilize the situation. Green brilliantly wore out Cornwallis who transfered his operations to Virginia, (1781). There he was trapped by a French fleet and a combined French-American army under G. Washington. Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, Virginia, 19 October 1781, ending the war.
	Why the British lost the war		British strategy failed because it: over-estimated loyalist strength Green's partisan style of warfare dissapated British strength in the South. Britain could not devote enough troops to the task of pacification due to strategic requirements in the Carribean and Mediterranean.
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	[e.2]		WASHINGTON'S STRATEGY AFTER 1778
	The "Fabian" general		Most historians agree that Washington was a "Fabian" general, and that as such he was the perfect commander-in-chief for a revolutionary army. Washington realized that he could not defeat the main strength of the British army. Twice he nearly lost his army, first at the Battle of Long Island (1776), and again at Brandywine (1777). Unable to defeat the British army in open combat, Washington assumed the defense after 1777. He retreated to the highlands of New York and established camps around the British forces in the city.
	His strategy		Washington's strategy: avoid open battle with the main British army. keep the Continental Army together. Between 1779-81, allow Green, & Morgan to wear out British generals in their attempt to subdue the southern colonies. maintain local patriot control of government and the militia.
	Washington understood the political nature of the war		Washington believed the key to victory was Time. The Revolution was an unlimited war in the sense that total independence was desired. If Washington could hold out long enough, the British ministry would get tired of the war and withdraw. This strategy of attrition worked: After Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, General John Conway, a member of Parliament, introduced a resolution that ended British attempts to impose a solution on its North American colonies by force. The Treaty of Paris (1783) formally ended hostilities.
	[d.4]		NATHANIEL GREEN (1742-1786)
	A home-grown American guerrila commander		Russell Weigley, an emminent American military historian, says of Nathaniel Greene that he "remains alone as an American master developing a strategy of unconventional warfare." Greene was one of the most successful American generals of the Revolutionary War. Washington allowed Greene to conduct an unconventional war in the South just like he allowed an unconventional war to occur in the Saratoga campaign (1777), probably because Greene treated loyalists with mercy.
	Green's strategy		Green skillfully used militia forces, Continental army contingents, and patriots during the southern campaigns against General Charles Corwallis from 1780-1781. Green's strategy was to divide his forces and hope that Cornwallis would to do the same.
	His success		Green's strategy worked. After the Battle of Guilford Courthouse (1781) in which a British force barely defeated Greene's army deep in the interior of NC, Greene regrouped and harrassed the British, leaving Cornwallis no choice except retreat. Green never won a battle against the British, but strategically he could could not have obtained better results. His strategy of attrition ruined the British army.
			RELATED WWW LINKS The Treaty of Paris (Original text) Revolutionary War Re-enactments Samuel Adams G. Gedney Godwin Homepage
		Late-war representation of a light infantryman of the 5th Regiment of Foot. The hat worn would actually have been of a special light infantry design.
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